In this work, we establish a game-theoretic framework to study cross-layer
coordinated attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPSs), where the attacker can
simultaneously interfere the physical process and launch jamming attacks on the
communication channels while the defender can dodge the jamming by dispensing
with observations. The generic framework captures a wide variety of classic
attack models on CPSs. Leveraging dynamic programming techniques, we fully
characterize the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) control strategies. We also
specify the SPE observation and jamming strategies through dynamic programming
equations and provide efficient computational methods to compute them. The
results demonstrate that the physical and the cyber attacks are coordinated and
depend on each other. On one hand, the control strategies are linear in the
estimate, and the large estimate error caused by jamming will induce
performance degradation. On the other hand, the capability in the physical
layer has a significant impact on the observation and jamming strategies.
Numerical examples illustrate the interesting interactions between the defender
and the attacker through their observation and jamming strategies.

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