This work establishes a game-theoretic framework to study cross-layer
coordinated attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPSs). The attacker can
interfere with the physical process and launch jamming attacks on the
communication channels simultaneously. At the same time, the defender can dodge
the jamming by dispensing with observations. The generic framework captures a
wide variety of classic attack models on CPSs. Leveraging dynamic programming
techniques, we fully characterize the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) control
strategies. We also derive the SPE observation and jamming strategies and
provide efficient computational methods to compute them. The results
demonstrate that the physical and cyber attacks are coordinated and depend on
each other.

On the one hand, the control strategies are linear in the state estimate, and
the estimate error caused by jamming attacks will induce performance
degradation. On the other hand, the interactions between the attacker and the
defender in the physical layer significantly impact the observation and jamming
strategies. Numerical examples illustrate the interactions between the defender
and the attacker through their observation and jamming strategies.

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