We consider the probabilistic planning problem where the agent (called Player
1, or P1) can jointly plan the control actions and sensor queries in a sensor
network and an attacker (called player 2, or P2) can carry out attacks on the
sensors. We model such an adversarial interaction using a formal model — a
reachability game with partially controllable observation functions. The main
contribution of this paper is to assess the cost of P1’s unawareness: Suppose
P1 misinterprets the sensor failures as probabilistic node failures due to
unreliable network communication, and P2 is aware of P1’s misinterpretation in
addition to her partial observability. Then, from which states can P2 carry out
sensor attacks to ensure, with probability one, that P1 will not be able to
complete her reachability task even though, due to misinterpretation, P1
believes that she can almost-surely achieve her task. We develop an algorithm
to solve the almost-sure winning sensor-attack strategy given P1’s
observation-based strategy. Our attack analysis could be used for attack
detection in wireless communication networks and the design of provably secured
attack-aware sensor allocation in decision-theoretic models for cyber-physical
systems.

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