In the honest majority setting, given broadcast in both rounds, it is known that the strongest guarantee — guaranteed output delivery — is achievable (Gordon et al. Crypto 2015). We show that, given broadcast in the first round only, guaranteed output delivery is still achievable. Given broadcast in the second round only, we give a new construction that achieves identifiable abort, and we show that fairness — and thus guaranteed output delivery — are not achievable in this setting. Finally, if only peer-to-peer channels are available, we show that the weakest guarantee — selective abort — is the only one achievable for corruption thresholds $t > 1$ and for $t = 1$ and $n = 3$. On the other hand, it is already known that selective abort can be achieved in these cases. In the remaining cases, i.e., $t = 1$ and $n > 3$, it is known (from the work of Ishai et al. at Crypto 2010, and Ishai et al. at Crypto 2015) that guaranteed output delivery (and thus all weaker guarantees) are possible.