Authentication continues to be a challenge for legacy
real-time communications networks involving low-speed buses
interconnecting resource-limited devices. A commercial vehicle
network is such a network which does not change much over
the years due to safety standards and regulations in the transportation
domain. The SAE J1939 incorporating the ISO 11898-
1 specification for the data link and physical layers of the
standard CAN and CAN-flexible data rate (CAN-FD) handles
communication among electronic control units (ECUs). The SAE
J1939 is susceptible to attacks such as replay, masquerading
and man-in-the-middle. This paper presents a formal analysis
of the existing authentication protocols for the SAE J1939
and identifies limitation, especially man-in-the-middle attack. To
mitigate the attack, we propose two new authentication protocols.
One pass authentication protocol is proposed for computationally
restricted nodes, and for the nodes that support public key
operations, a certificateless signature-based authentication protocol
is proposed which is based on certificateless key insulated
manageable signature scheme (CL-KIMS). The security of the
new protocol suite and the signature scheme is formally analysed
in the random oracle model. We use the Tamarin tool to verify
mutual authentication, session key security, known key secrecy
and forward security of the proposed protocols. Performance
comparison shows that compared with the existing protocol
suite, the new protocol suite is computation and communication
efficient with robust security. Our simulation study in Matlab
2018a reveals that the key exchange protocols in the new protocol
suite are efficient regarding consumption of lesser total message
delay than its counterpart.

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